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Background
On the last day of 2019, a cluster of cases of a pneumonia with unknown cause were reported by 
the Chinese authorities to the World Health Organization (WHO), believed to be connected to a 
seafood market in Wuhan, China. This market was closed the following day. On 7 January 2020, a 
novel coronavirus was isolated, and known pathogens were ruled out.1
Coronaviruses usually cause respiratory illness ranging from the common cold to severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS). Clinical symptoms and signs of the Wuhan coronavirus include fever, 
with some sufferers experiencing difficulty breathing and bilateral pulmonary infiltrates seen on chest 
X- ray. WHO are referring to it as ‘2019- nCov’.
At the time of writing, there have been over 4,500 confirmed cases and 106 deaths, including 
among healthcare workers. Over 98% of these cases are within mainland China, but cases have also 
been confirmed in tens of other countries.
Containing the outbreak
There is international concern regarding the potential spread of the virus, especially given Wuhan’s 
status as a major domestic and international hub, its large population of 11 million, and current 
Chinese New Year celebrations. To curb the spread, all public transport and air travel to and from 
Wuhan has been stopped, with other Chinese cities following suit. International exit screening of 
travellers with health information dissemination has begun, including at Heathrow airport. Contacts of 
confirmed cases are recommended to remain under medical observation, avoiding travel within the 
viral incubation period of 14 days.2
Whilst the mortality and infectivity of the 2019- nCoV are still unknown,3 there is understandable 
interest and concern regarding the potential for a pandemic as experienced in 2009 with H1N1 
(‘swine flu’). However, the WHO decided against declaring a public health emergency of international 
concern on 22 January. Current data suggests the 2019- nCoV has a lower mortality than SARS (another 
coronavirus), which killed nearly 800 people globally before being contained in 2003.
Despite current reassurances about the severity of 2019- nCoV, it will be incredibly difficult to 
further contain the cross- border spread of the virus due to the sheer volume of global travel. It will 
be necessary to coordinate a unified, global response across many differing geopolitical boundaries, 
political settings, cultures, and health system contexts. The fact that incubating cases may have left 
Wuhan before the quarantine began complicates matters further, as does the emerging possibility 
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that some carriers may be asymptomatic. WHO has asked all countries to prepare for cases including 
through surveillance, tracing, treatment and isolation practices, and by sharing data.4 The resources 
needed to do this effectively may not be routinely available, however, particularly in low- resource 
settings.
The Chinese response
In the past decade, there has been an increased Chinese political focus on health, both nationally 
and internationally. Examples of a growing role in global health include unprecedented involvement 
in managing the Ebola outbreak and the ambitious ‘One Belt One Road’ 64- country development 
initiative, which encompasses 66% of the world’s population and a third of global gross domestic 
product.5
Chinese authorities were quick to close the Wuhan market, conduct epidemiological assessments, 
and notify the global health community.6 The genetic sequence of the virus was shared by Chinese 
authorities on the 12 January to aid international development of effective diagnostics.1 President Xi 
Jinping is personally leading a special cross- departmental taskforce, involving the heads of the health, 
security, traffic, education, and commerce departments.
WHO response
The WHO exists to coordinate and lead in global health, and for the past week the Strategic Health 
Operations Centre (SHOC) has been holding hourly meetings to keep abreast of nCoV developments. 
The SHOC coordinates information and responses through a network of WHO teams, member states, 
and partner organisations; providing advice, tracking cases, and monitoring essential resources in the 
field. An Emergency Committee advises the Director General, who makes the ultimate decision on 
when and whether to declare a public health emergency of international concern. Thus far, escalation 
to this status has not been made, but the committee has planned to reconvene only days after their 
initial meeting to review this decision, closely following the rapid development of events.4
Domestic implications
The UK government is tracing all those who have arrived from Wuhan within the past 14 days. To date, 
31 completed tests on suspected cases have been returned negative and Public Health England (PHE) is 
advising that the risk to the public remains low. Due to international travel, as well as widespread media 
and public interest, the number of suspected cases is anticipated to rise and confirmed cases in the UK 
may yet be seen.
It is reasonable to expect that the widespread attention will impact on the demand for appointments 
in GP practices in coming weeks, as well as anxiety for members of the public. PHE has advised that any 
person coughing, feeling short of breath, or experiencing fever should seek medical attention if they 
have recently travelled to Wuhan. Interim guidance has been issued specifically for primary care by 
PHE.7 In summary, unwell patients with a relevant travel history should isolate themselves and consult 
remotely. If they come to the practice, they should be isolated on entrance to the GP surgery. If the 
consultation has already begun, the healthcare practitioner should leave the room, close the door, and 
wash their hands thoroughly with soap and water. Clinical history can be conducted by telephone, and 
physical examination should be avoided. If possible, arrangements should be made for any further 
assessment to occur in secondary care, after first discussing the differential with the hospital (and 
ambulance team if required). The local PHE health protection team must be informed. Generally, 
coronaviruses show more severe symptoms in those with chronic diseases, immunosuppression, or 
who are older, so these individuals may be more at risk of severe progression.
The central role of primary care
Whilst strong epidemiology and surveillance systems are indispensable tools for the detection and 
monitoring of outbreaks and public health emergencies, strong primary care systems form the foundation 
of any emergency response. In the UK, primary care handles over 95% of all health system activity. WHO 
member states have repeatedly affirmed their commitment to developing their primary care systems 
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with a view to training up community- based health professionals who are able to provide care across 
the spectrum of prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. As the ‘front door’ of the health 
system, primary care professionals should be involved in planning and action for health emergency risk 
management. WONCA (the global professional body for family medicine) has actively championed the 
ways in which primary care can be supported to deliver care during population emergencies. National 
primary care bodies can coordinate with public health leads to cascade information to practitioners, 
communicate with the public, and collate health intelligence from the frontline primary care.8
The Ebola crisis taught us a valuable lesson about what happens when an outbreak takes health 
workers away from core functions to focus on crisis response; the number of people who died from 
reduced access to usual care probably exceeded the number killed by the virus.9 Strong health 
systems built on comprehensive primary care are able to integrate both functions, disseminating 
the emergency response resources and information required to community- level staff who have the 
breadth of training required to manage new suspected cases alongside routine family medicine. 
Decent access to primary health care is essential in health emergencies, and its infrastructure crucial 
for containment,10 just as good access to high- quality primary care is at the foundation of any strong 
health system.11
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